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Abstract 
This article analyses the transport policy record of the 2010-2015 Conservative-
Liberal Democrat Coalition and 2015-16 Conservative majority UK 
governments. We argue that the style of policy making under these 
administrations departed significantly from that of previous decades, which had 
been characterised by the ascendancy of specific technical disciplines and 
decision making norms about how transport planning should be carried out. Our 
key contention is that despite abandoning the idea of a single, overall narrative 
for transport policy, these governments (perhaps unwittingly) gave new life to 
broader debates about what transport investment is actually for and how 
investment decisions should be made. We interpret this as a shift away from the 
longstanding idea of a ‘deliberate’ strategy of intervention to a more ‘emergent’ 
approach, which raises important new questions about the future of transport 
policy both in terms of the objectives it seeks to realise and the relative 
influence of professional/technical and political actors in the policy process. 
 
 
 2 
Introduction 
 
For more than 50 years, UK governments of all political persuasions have 
published a succession of documents heralding a brave new age of transport 
policy. Highlights include Buchanan’s Traffic in Towns in the 1960s (Ministry of 
Transport, 1963), which correctly predicted how the insatiable demands for 
more road space arising from mass car ownership would impact upon historic 
towns and cities; Roads for Prosperity’s ‘biggest road building programme since 
the Romans’ in the heady days of the 1980s economic boom (Department of 
Transport, 1989); and the immodestly titled A New Deal for Transport, which 
promised a transformation that would “give transport the highest possible 
priority” (Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR), 
1998) such that its accompanying £180bn Ten Year Plan would “deliver radical 
improvements for passengers, motorists, business – and all of us as citizens 
concerned about congestion, safety and a better environment” (DETR, 2000). 
 
The contradiction in all of this is that despite a plethora of highly ambitious 
policy statements, Britain’s transport system remains underdeveloped 
compared with those of other major European economies because Ministers of 
whichever party have all-too-often been unable to turn policy rhetoric into action 
(Table 1). The collapse of the Blair government’s New Deal for Transport 
demonstrates this especially well. Despite deliberately referencing Roosevelt’s 
massive public works programmes of the 1930s, the New Deal and its 
ambitious delivery programme actually failed to deliver very much at all on the 
ground. Instead of light rail in 25 cities across the country, only one new system 
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and the extension of one other were actually achieved; congestion charging 
failed to move beyond London despite ambitions to have systems operating in 
eight cities by the end of the Ten Year Plan period; the domestic rail network 
had to be rescued from a maintenance crisis rather than expanded and 
improved (Preston and Robins, 2013); and south east England’s runway 
capacity constraints remained unaddressed (Bentley, 2014). By the end of the 
Ten Year Plan period in 2010, what had started out as the most ambitious 
strategy to transform transport for several decades had been comprehensively 
“de-railed” (Grayling, 2004; Headicar 2009; for an extensive review of why the 
New Deal fell apart see Docherty and Shaw, 2011).  
 
TABLE 1 HERE  
 
The 1997-2010 Labour government’s legacy was not only that many of its 
proposed infrastructure schemes and congestion charging were not delivered. 
Perhaps a more important consequence of the New Deal – one that was almost 
certainly unintended – was that its persistent non-delivery fuelled an already-
existing policy tradition (Orr and Vince, 2009) of scepticism about large-scale 
infrastructure spending. Road building, increasingly under attack for simply 
inducing new traffic and not providing the expected economic returns (Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution, 1994; Crafts, 2009), became politically 
toxic with the environmental protests of the mid 1990s (Doherty, 1999), and 
then formally an ‘option of last resort’ in Labour’s very first statement on 
transport in government after the 1997 election (DETR, 1997). Added to this, 
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the Party’s u-turn on recreating a ‘publicly owned, publicly accountable railway’ 
combined with the weak powers afforded to the new Strategic Rail Authority 
made it clear that Labour in government had little real commitment to promoting 
better rail infrastructure. By the end of the 2000s, even accounting for some 
revision of its early anti road-building stance (Shaw et al, 2006), such was 
Labour’s general lack of interest in delivering anything of note in transport that 
Ministers were reluctant even to embrace ‘softer’, non engineering-led initiatives 
such as Smarter Choices and Cycling Demonstration Towns capable of 
achieving quite substantial congestion reductions at extremely modest cost (see 
Cairns et al, 2008). 
 
David Cameron’s Liberal-Conservative Coalition government formed after the 
May 2010 UK General Election therefore took office at a time when the very 
idea of a comprehensive policy for transport in Britain appeared dead, and  
early signals in the Coalition Agreement gave little hint of an impending change 
in approach. Extending to no more than half a page, the twelve bullet point 
summaries addressed the most important policy challenges in the vaguest of 
terms (“We will make Network Rail more accountable to its customers”), whilst 
also detailing quite specific actions for those populist issues close to the hearts 
of some of those who had just voted the administration into office (“We will stop 
central government funding for new fixed speed cameras”) (HM Government, 
2010: 31). It is clear from this and the Coalition’s other early statements that 
Ministers had few if any clearly defined policy objectives for transport beyond 
fuzzy statements about improving the railway and ending the so-called ‘war on 
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the motorist’ (see Monbiot, 2005), both narratives that consistently play well 
amongst Conservative core support. Whilst this may have reflected differences 
in approach to transport policy between the Coalition partners, it did afford 
incoming Ministers the opportunity to bring about a significant break from 
previous practice by assembling their transport policy in an issues-led manner 
over the first few years of the new government (see House of Commons, 2011). 
 
Objectives, scope and analytical approach 
Our article examines key transport decisions made by the Coalition and its 
immediate successor government, and assesses what their potential longer 
term implications might be. Our core objective is to explain why, under the 
Cameron administrations, a fundamental shift in policy formulation occurred, 
with the longstanding ascendancy of some particular technical disciplines and 
methodological techniques facing robust political challenge for the first time in 
several decades. In turn, this has ramifications for which projects get built and 
which do not, and the relative influence and power of professional/technical and 
political actors in determining spending priorities, a theme of ongoing interest in 
the policy literature (see Neuhold et al 2013). 
 
In theoretical terms, we wish to make a contribution to redressing the shortfall in 
the amount of academic work on transport policy that addresses the first 
principles question of what the objectives for transport policy actually are, and 
how these are decided upon. In their review of 100 articles on transport policy, 
Marsden and Reardon (2017: 243) noted that “only four focused on the ‘ends or 
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aims’ of policy; the goals, objectives or settings”. Here, then, we attempt to 
understand what these authors call ‘the logics at play’ in transport policy by 
moving beyond the sectoral literature on policy making and governance in the 
transport domain and applying key ideas from the mainstream strategy literature 
to analyse the changes in approach under the 2010-16 governments. In 
presenting our findings, we first examine how Ministers re-evaluated the role 
and purpose of surface transport infrastructure investment. We then move on to 
explore the implications of this revised thinking for transport project appraisal, 
using the planned High Speed 2 (HS2) railway as an example. In this context, 
we consider how one legacy of the Cameron administrations’ shift in approach 
might, albeit unwittingly, be to present a new life for transport policy given the 
opportunities that arose to rethink how we decide which investments to pursue, 
and why. Our conclusion interprets the Coalition’s approach to transport in 
broader terms as an ‘emergent’ strategy (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985) focused 
on capturing the best (political) opportunities for delivering infrastructure, 
replacing a rather more ‘deliberate’ strategy with its grand plans for multimodal 
integration and sustainability that never came to pass. 
 
Methodologically, our paper addresses Marsden and Reardon’s (2017) finding 
that only 10% of the ‘policy’ papers they reviewed actually reported 
engagement with policy makers, by augmenting primary documentary research 
with context and insight from a series of interviews with 20 senior policy actors 
(ten senior civil servants in the UK and Scottish governments, as well as current 
and former Ministers, policy advisors to government departments, academic 
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commentators on transport and public policy development more generally and 
senior leaders in private sector transport operating companies). All of our 
respondents were identified through an initial ‘purposeful’ sampling approach 
(Baxter and Eyles, 1997) with additional ‘snowballing’ (Crang and Cook, 2007) 
where appropriate. We interviewed some individuals more than once. Given the 
potential sensitivity of the material, most of the interviews were noted rather 
than recorded, and where we present direct quotations these have been 
checked with the source and anonymised.  
 
We should be clear that the scope of our analysis is UK government policy in 
respect of ‘national’ surface transport development. We do not cover the vexed 
issue of airport capacity as this would be another paper in itself (see Le Blond 
et al, 2016; Vogel and Bates, 2015). Nor does our work address the 
increasingly complex arrangements for development of transport at a local and 
regional level through the ‘devolution’ of certain responsibilities to new 
Combined Authorities and elected Mayors, and the creation of (non-elected) 
Local Enterprise Partnerships across England. Further, many aspects of 
transport policy are devolved to the Scottish Parliament, National Assembly for 
Wales, Northern Ireland Assembly and Greater London Authority. Although 
some of the specific policy issues we explore in the paper (e.g. roads) apply to 
England only, others (HS2) have cross-border implications, while overall 
government macro-economic policy, which underpins most investment 
priorities, is ‘reserved’ on a UK-wide basis. We therefore refer to ‘Britain’ 
throughout in the interests of legibility. Finally, as our specific focus is on the 
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changing strategic mindset underpinning the UK government’s approach to 
transport investment, we do not explicitly address the issue of the spatial 
patterning of investment choices, although this clearly remains an important 
research agenda in its own right given the scale of the choices we examine 
(see Schwanen, 2016). 
 
The Chancellor dons a hard hat 
 
The first 18 months of the Coalition’s term involved a considerable amount of 
thinking out loud on what to do about transport infrastructure investment. In 
June 2010, five weeks after taking office, the deputy Finance Minister 
announced a series of substantial cuts to government spending, including the 
£1.1bn upgrade to the A14 in Cambridgeshire, the largest planned road project 
at the time. The following week, the Chancellor’s Emergency Budget 
announced the creation of Infrastructure UK, a new agency with a remit to cut 
the costs of infrastructure delivery and draft in as much private sector money as 
possible (HM Treasury, 2010a). The Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) 
and accompanying first National Infrastructure Plan (NIP) in October 2010 set 
out this agenda in more detail (HM Treasury, 2010b, 2010c). Although 
committed projects were largely safeguarded, they were quite openly framed as 
“projects that deliver greater benefits in return for their costs”. Overall, the cuts 
were regarded as swingeing and, taken together with the Department for 
Transport itself being asked to find some £300m per year in savings from its 
own operating budget (The Independent, 2012), it seemed as if transport would 
rank even lower in the domestic policy agenda under the Coalition than it had 
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under Labour.  
 
But in contrast to other areas of government spending, the period of austerity 
for transport turned out to be rather short lived. As soon as Autumn 2011, 
exactly one year after the Coalition’s first CSR, large parts of the transport 
budget were restored to levels at or near those inherited by the new 
government (pteg 2013a; 2013b). Particularly striking was that 2010’s £1bn-
plus cuts to the Highways Agency’s strategic roads programme was almost 
entirely reversed. Overall, whereas in 2010 the June emergency budget and 
October CSR had envisaged real terms reductions in capital spending in pursuit 
of broader fiscal consolidation objectives, the 2011 Autumn Statement switched 
around £5bn from current expenditure to capital. This set the tone for the 
remainder of the Coalition’s term, with significant new capital expenditure 
directed to the railways and trunk roads network across England (Tables 2 and 
3). 
 
TABLES 2 AND 3 HERE 
 
What lay behind this quick change of mind? There are several clear examples 
of an evident shift in underlying outlook between the 2010 and 2011 Autumn 
Statements and NIPs. Whilst the preamble to the 2010 NIP agonised over the 
condition of the UK’s ageing infrastructure and how modernisation could be 
afforded given public spending cuts and the extremely high level of costs in the 
British construction sector, the 2011 document was much more bullish: 
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“Infrastructure networks form the backbone of a modern economy and are 
a major determinant of growth and productivity… However, historically the 
UK’s approach to the development of these networks has been 
fragmented and reactive… To remain globally competitive, the UK needs 
to address these failures and develop an infrastructure capable of 
supporting a dynamic, modern economy” (HM Treasury, 2011: 5). 
 
The senior policy makers and observers in and around Whitehall we interviewed 
were in no doubt that the government’s volte-face was down to the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer himself. Whilst the public record of the time hints at this, 
including the challenge in his 2011 Autumn Statement speech that Britons 
should “see what countries like China or Brazil are building, and you’ll also see 
why we risk falling behind the rest of the world” (Financial Times, 2011: 
unpaginated), one of our respondents put it more colourfully: “Go into the 
Crossrail1 tunnels at night and it’s George Osborne you’ll find in a hard hat and 
hi-vis jacket” (see The Guardian, 2015 about ‘George the Builder’). Indeed, 
Osborne has subsequently revealed that he had been grappling with the 
dilemma of finding the large, quick savings in public expenditure demanded by 
the Coalition’s manifesto whilst at the same time planning ahead: “in my first 
week in office I rejected the Treasury’s proposal that we shouldn’t go ahead 
with the Crossrail project… no country thrives if it doesn’t build for the future” 
(Centre for Policy Studies, 2016, unpaginated). 
                                                        
1 Crossrail is a £15bn project increasing central London’s rail capacity by 10% with a new east-west tunnel 
through Docklands, the City and the West End connecting to the wider south east commuter network. 
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The importance of this shift in philosophy should not be underestimated. There 
is clearly some path dependency at play as the unintended consequences of 
the previous Labour government’s decisions left much less scope for reducing 
transport capital expenditure as quickly as the Coalition had initially intended. 
Particularly important here is the funding structure in the rail industry: Labour 
retained and reinforced the privatised industry’s five-year funding cycle based 
on a regulatory ‘Control Period’, which effectively locked the Coalition into 
Labour’s spending plans. These had remained necessarily generous because 
of the collapse of infrastructure owner Railtrack after a serious train crash at 
Hatfield in 2000, and its subsequent replacement by Network Rail.  
 
But the Chancellor’s normative position that major infrastructure is essential for 
reasons of global economic competitiveness is altogether more important and 
profound than a tactical switch in the face of practical accounting difficulties. 
Successive governments’ inability to deliver much of their planned transport 
investment can be explained in part because the Treasury and many other 
influential voices advising Ministers did not really believe in the fundamental 
utility of this kind of expenditure: indeed, Treasury mandarins had even been 
rather proud of the fact that they had avoided the same levels of transport 
capital expenditure as those European economies regarded as Britain’s peers 
(Docherty and Shaw, 2011). This also meant that in periods of political- or 
economic difficulty there were few elected or civil service champions prepared 
to defend such expenditure on major infrastructure as was actually planned. 
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In deciding to pursue a much greater focus on infrastructure investment, the 
Chancellor appears to have come to his own conclusion about the conflicting 
claims made in the British transport infrastructure debate over the preceding 20 
years: for every government report such as the Eddington Transport Study 
(Eddington, 2006) emphasising the marginal returns of much new large-scale 
domestic infrastructure investment in a mature transport network, there were 
others (Canning and Bennathan, 2007; Crafts, 2009; Egert et al., 2009) that 
continued to make the case for investment in transport infrastructure as a 
worthwhile and important element of any economic policy in pursuit of growth 
(see also Holmgren and Merkel, 2017). In this context, the Coalition’s post-2011 
approach to transport infrastructure investment was really quite ideological, both 
in the domestic political sense of rejecting the preceding government’s New 
Deal and its downplaying of the importance of capital investment, and in terms 
of adopting Michael Porter’s elaboration of nation states being in competition 
with one another (Porter, 2002; Furman et al, 2002). In effect, Osborne was 
embracing the normative position that substantial transport infrastructure 
investment was required to maintain national economic competitiveness. 
 
Project delivery and appraisal 
As successive governments prior to the Coalition had demonstrated, it is one 
thing privileging investment in transport projects at the rhetorical level but quite 
another to deliver them on the ground. In their efforts to achieve the latter, the 
Cameron administrations made two distinct breaks from the practice they had 
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inherited. The first of these was the move back to a mode-by-mode approach to 
the way in which transport policy is formulated and delivered. Not only had 
Labour’s New Deal failed to result in much infrastructure investment, but 
Ministers had also found the challenge of delivering a suite of multi-modal 
transport initiatives beyond them. This was most strikingly demonstrated by the 
collapse of the so-called Multi-Modal Studies (MMSs) where integrated 
packages of schemes were disaggregated to the point that only a few long-
desired road schemes were actually taken foreword (see Shaw et al, 2006). As 
one of our interviewees put it, the incoming Coalition deemed Labour’s failures 
with the MMSs symptomatic of the broader problem that the desire of many in 
the transport sector for a genuinely multimodal approach to policy making and 
planning was impossible for government to deliver in reality. 
 
As such the Coalition set about developing its policies and investment plans for 
inter-urban transport development, acknowledging that the delivery arms of the 
transport sector are, and will likely remain, organised in a modal structure 
(primarily road and rail) with the view that achieving better delivery requires 
greater discipline and focus within these silos rather than between them (Table 
4). We have already seen how rail had benefited from being ‘quarantined’ within 
a tightly defined, medium-term funding settlement, and the Coalition effectively 
‘cloned’ aspects of this approach and applied it to trunk roads in England. An 
arms-length infrastructure owner, Highways England, was created and charged 
with developing a network enhancement plan for a regulated four-year funding 
cycle – the ‘Road Period’ – almost exactly mirroring the Control Periods under 
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which Network Rail operates. 
 
TABLE 4 HERE 
 
Rather than revisit arguments from the 2000s about the role of roads relative to 
other modes, the Road Investment Strategy (DfT, 2014b) produced to cover the 
first road period considers the assets that Highways England has inherited, how 
these assets perform from an operational perspective (based on metrics such 
as journey time and reliability, safety and user satisfaction) and sets out how a 
series of interventions – junction improvements, traffic management schemes, 
dualling and some new bypasses – would help improve performance. Over 
time, these will coalesce to create a better network with a hierarchy of routes 
based on quality of service criteria. Indeed, such is the clarity of purpose of the 
Strategy that the impact of HS2 on the road network merits only a single 
paragraph in a document of some 120 pages. 
 
The second break from the past came about as a result of how the Coalition’s 
shift in positioning shone a light into the complex debate over how different 
transport interventions perform according to the standard appraisal 
methodology of calculating their Benefit:Cost Ratio (BCR) and therefore which 
transport schemes should be built and which should not. In reframing the 
narrative about the value of transport infrastructure investment in much more 
broad-brush, narrative terms than the technical language of BCRs, the 
Chancellor exposed an important shibboleth of transport policy in the UK, 
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collectively the hegemony of a particular kind of transport economic appraisal in 
decision making, the real world limitations of this analytical approach and the 
frequent tensions between its outcomes and political imperatives.  
 
Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) was first adopted for transport in Britain for the 
appraisal of roads projects in the 1960s (Worsley and Mackie, 2015). The basic 
idea of CBA is to determine whether or not any given scheme will provide value 
for money, by comparing its cost of construction and maintenance over a given 
period (usually 30-60 years) with the monetary value of the benefits it is likely to 
realise. Most of this monetary value is assumed to derive from time savings 
realised by the scheme’s implementation, on the basis that some or all of the 
time we spend travelling is somehow ‘lost’ to the economy (see Wardman et al, 
2015). The output of any given appraisal is expressed in modern language as a 
BCR.  
 
It is obvious that this number is deceptively simple and few would claim the 
technique is perfect. While it is relatively straightforward, if not exactly 
uncontentious, to estimate the cost of building and maintaining a scheme 
(Stopher and Stanley, 2014; although see also Flyvberg et al 2003) and by how 
much the direct operating costs of vehicles might change, it is more problematic 
to account for costs and benefits that have no intrinsic monetary value. How 
much is a shorter journey time really worth to any given individual on any 
particular day? What about to the economy as a whole? How much is saving a 
life worth? Countless stated choice studies have estimated how much people 
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would be willing to pay for such things (see Bates et al, 2001; Hensher, 2001; 
McFadden, 1998) although these are by no means flawless and in any event 
fail to address the crucial point that the relationship between travel time saved 
and empirically verifiable economic growth in a given area is much less clear-
cut than often portrayed (see, for example, Wenban-Smith, 2010; Mullen and 
Marsden, 2015; Vickerman, 2017).  
 
Although CBA retains influential supporters (see, for example, Worsley and 
Mackie, 2015) and there have been advances in moving beyond a narrow focus 
on user benefits (Vickerman, 2017), it is no surprise that CBA’s reliance upon 
monetisation as a means of appraising the characteristics of a scheme or policy 
has been heavily critiqued (Ackerman and Heizerling, 2004; Mokhtarian and 
Handy, 2009; Hickman and Dean, 2017). Indeed, critiques have sharpened 
further as concepts such as journey quality and utility – it is easier than ever in 
the ICT age to spend time ‘on the move’ productively (Lyons, 2015) – and the 
impacts of commuting stress on health and wellbeing gain more attention 
(Lyons, 2016). Aware of such criticisms, the Labour governments of Tony Blair 
introduced a New Approach to Appraisal (NATA) that recognised the need to 
ascribe more weight to qualitative judgements in the appraisal process (Walton 
and Shaw, 2003). Whether or not this made the appraisal process any more or 
less robust is open to question – NATA retained CBA “as one, perhaps the key, 
element” of its appraisal framework (Vickerman, 2000:9) – although, 
interestingly, our interviewees revealed the view the most important function of 
BCR calculations was not necessarily the meaning of the figures per se, but 
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their role in negotiations between the Treasury and the sponsors of particular 
transport projects vying for investment. Especially in times of austerity, BCRs 
retain credibility because they can be presented as an impartial means of 
deciding which transport schemes should and should not go ahead2. At present, 
schemes with a BCR of 2.0:1 are categorised by the DfT as ‘high value for 
money’ (those over 4.0:1 are ‘very high value for money’) and are most likely to 
be in the frame for funding.  
 
Unfortunately, the simple ranking of projects by BCR, even in the impossible 
scenario that these numbers could be made to be perfect, would still be 
problematic. Sir David Higgins, who chairs the company set up to manage the 
delivery of HS2, Britain’s new high speed railway due to open in 2026 (see 
below), told a House of Lords Inquiry: 
 
“[Cost-benefit analysis] is meant to be a method of rating various 
infrastructure projects against other infrastructure projects to determine 
which is the most important. What would be nice, of course, would be to 
have a national transport strategy against which to measure that; that 
would be a discipline that would improve the whole debate on how you 
analyse individual projects. We do not have that today” (EAC, 2015: 12) 
 
                                                        
2 It was also suggested that the apparently strong evidence base underlying BCR figures – 
strong in the sense that it generates numbers which act as “signs and signals” (Vollmer, 2016) 
that can reassure politicians – provides Ministers in the Department for Transport with useful 
ammunition to deploy during Spending Reviews compared with other departments that don’t 
use CBA and thus could be portrayed as ‘analytically lagging’. 
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Even where such a strategy is supposed to exist, such as under Labour 
following A New Deal for Transport, in the much less rational world where 
transport policy meets transport politics, such discipline in how projects are 
analysed and selected can never be guaranteed. Söderbaum (2006) makes the 
point that BCRs can mask questionable assumptions and ideological 
orientations surrounding the methods that calculate them. Indeed, it is 
instructive to consider how BCRs have been manipulated, overlooked or 
altogether ignored when they stand in the way of the approval of ‘favoured’ 
interventions, especially big and expensive ones close to the hearts of the most 
senior politicians (see Eliasson et al., 2015). One well-documented illustration is 
the £500m per year – or £30bn over a standard 60 year Treasury appraisal 
period – English Concessionary Fares (ECF) scheme that provided free bus 
travel to the over 60s and disabled people. This was never subjected to any 
kind of CBA, as reported by a senior civil servant: “We have not tried to do an 
assessment in economic terms of the benefits of it. As the Minister has said, it is 
essentially a political decision for wider reasons” (House of Commons, 2008: 
Q443). 
 
The need for speed 
Tellingly, the Cameron governments’ final Secretary of State for Transport, 
Patrick McLoughlin, went so far as to state openly that BCRs had become less 
important than they had ‘traditionally’ been purported to be (The Guardian 2013, 
unpaginated). This shift was formally signalled in new DfT guidance on 
‘Transport Business Cases’ (DfT, 2013), although the extent to which this 
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clarified the role of BCRs in project appraisal remained contested. By far the 
most controversial and illuminating example of this is HS2, a Y-shaped high 
speed rail network to be built from London to Birmingham and then north to 
Manchester, Sheffield and Leeds (Figure 1). The project is phased in two 
stages with the first constructing the line to Birmingham and a junction with the 
existing railway to the north, and the second completing the Y to Manchester 
and Leeds. At the currently estimated outturn cost of more than £50 billion in 
2015 prices, it is the single most expensive transport project in the UK for a 
generation at least.  
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Two critical factors combine to produce the very modest calculated BCRs for 
HS2. First is the sheer scale of the price tag given the very high civil 
engineering cost base in the UK, which means the denominator of the 
benefit:cost equation is challenging per se (HM Treasury, 2010c; Department 
for Transport and Office for Rail Regulation, 2011). Second is the role of the 
value of time as the most significant variable driving the benefit side. Even with 
a design speed of 400 kilometres per hour (significantly above most continental 
high speed lines), HS2 struggles to deliver enough time savings to generate a 
convincing BCR. Worse still, whilst the core assumption underpinning the 
monetisation of time savings – that travel time is productive working time ‘lost’ 
to the economy – might have been truer in the 1960s, it is patently not the case 
in the 2010s when people have any number of opportunities to be productive 
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throughout their journeys. Thus although the Foreword to the Strategic Case for 
HS2 states that “The new north-south railway is one of the most potentially 
beneficial… infrastructure projects on the planet” (DfT, 2013: 1), the BCR for 
this project of such declared import is currently calculated for the whole Y 
network at 1.8. If the postulated wider economic benefits such as productivity 
gains are included this rises to 2.3, still way below that of many other (less 
glamorous) projects but magically high enough to attain the ‘value for money’ 
status necessary to pass the DfT’s primary BCR test (see NAO, 2013).  
 
It is perhaps unsurprising that numerous experienced commentators described 
the decision to pursue HS2 on value for money grounds as marginal at best, 
with one memorably suggesting that “it does violence to the English language to 
describe a benefit cost ratio of 2.3 as ‘high value for money’” (EAC, 2015: 101). 
The House of Commons’ Public Accounts Committee went further, criticising 
the DfT’s appraisal methodologies directly for generating “decisions based on 
fragile numbers, out-of-date data and assumptions which do not reflect real life” 
(PAC, 2013: unpaginated). HS2, in other words, demonstrated spectacularly the 
limit of government’s ability to reconcile – or at least gloss over – politically 
unfortunate outcomes of the economic appraisal of transport infrastructure 
investment. It laid bare how Ministers themselves have become unconvinced by 
the traditional technocratic arguments around the monetisation of discrete 
benefits and are instead seeking to reframe the agenda (see Schön and Rein, 
1995) to one in which the decision is overtly aligned with their more ‘strategic’ 
goals of economic growth, productivity and international competitiveness 
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(Porter, 2000): 
 
“HS2 will generate jobs, help rebalance the economy between north and 
south, and provide a platform for the country’s future prosperity. It’s a 
statement about the UK’s ambition to be a world-class economy in the 
21st century” (DfT, 2015: Appendix 3). 
 
While we applaud the apparent move away from hiding the messy 
contradictions of economic assessment and political desires in the policy 
equivalent of the ‘smoke-filled room’, the adoption of a strategic narrative for 
transport infrastructure investment approaching a ‘just do it’ or ‘build it and they 
will come’ attitude to transport infrastructure investment also raises some 
obvious questions. Political honesty is refreshing, but spending upwards of 
£50bn on a scheme on the basis that it is ‘good to have’ will not strike many 
people as evidence-based policy making (see What Works Centre for Local 
Economic Growth, 2015). And if (strong enough) political intent trumps 
established economic method when it comes to grands projets, it becomes 
appropriate to ask whether what’s good enough for the biggest infrastructure 
investment in a generation is good enough for all the others, and in turn 
whether other transport policies and strategies should be revisited in a similar 
manner. 
 
Implications for British transport policy 
For us at least, reports of the ‘death’ of British transport policy accompanying 
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the Labour government’s demise in 2010 were anything but exaggerated. The 
Party’s bold vision of a national, integrated strategy for transport turned out to 
be over-ambitious in and of itself, but it was also the last in a long line of 
similarly grand yet undelivered plans stretching back decades. At the same 
time, the 50-year search for the Holy Grail of a genuinely comprehensive 
benefit:cost methodology to justify interventions within such strategies was no 
nearer fruition, and the role of BCRs in project appraisal had been publicly 
undermined by Ministers. Still, beneath the once-in-a-generation sized project of 
HS2, we wonder if the Cameron administrations’ range of discrete project 
interventions, organised by individual transport mode rather than on a 
multimodal basis, represent a de facto national infrastructure delivery plan. In 
adopting a different mindset with regard to what transport investment is ‘for’ in 
the first place, what the limits of traditional appraisal might be in evidencing this 
purpose, and a focus on strategy emerging as the outcome of successful 
project delivery, did the Coalition – quite possibly unwittingly – breathe new ‘life’ 
into the transport policy debate just as it had appeared completely moribund? 
 
If so, there will be many questions arising about why we invest in transport, how 
we determine our policy priorities and thus what particular projects to build. With 
regard to the first of these, the Coalition’s priority was predicated on the belief 
that transport investment would play a significant role in boosting the economy. 
How far will environmental or social imperatives continue to assert themselves, 
and if so in what particular guise? Or, if the narrative about large scale transport 
investment being good for growth and international competitiveness survives in 
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the short term, how long will it be until the lack of compelling evidence for this 
proposition – something first pointed out officially to Whitehall twenty years ago 
(see SACTRA, 1996) – is remembered? 
 
In relation to policy priorities, although there are clearly opportunities to be 
grasped from the legacy of the Cameron governments’ decisions, there are also 
significant risks. Chief amongst these is the danger of “strategic drift” (see 
Johnson, 1988), which occurs when organisations that are highly focused on 
project delivery and whose wider strategy is built incrementally fail to adapt to 
changes in the context for their operations. One obvious example of this is the 
potential for the different organisations involved in delivering ‘on the ground’ 
transport projects – Highways England, Network Rail and so on – to react in a 
manner that is contradictory or inefficient to emerging transport trends such as 
vehicle automation or ‘peak car’ (see Goodwin and van Dender, 2013; Docherty 
et al., 2017).  Also, just because successive governments have failed to deliver 
transport policy on a multimodal, integrative basis doesn’t mean that this is not 
in fact required (Docherty and Shaw, 2011). An approach to strategy based on 
each transport mode may be more likely to ensure that money is actually spent 
on the schemes that are put in policy documents, but it privileges infrastructure 
‘solutions’ and is no guarantee that the resources directed to transport overall 
will really deliver the benefits such investment is expected to achieve. 
 
In thinking about what projects should be built, the role of BCR in transport 
scheme appraisal is bound to be subject to further scrutiny. A better way of 
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deciding between infrastructure schemes in future might be to follow Sir David 
Higgins’ advice and determine – perhaps through the National Infrastructure 
Commission, another of Osborne’s creations – which interventions are most 
likely to achieve the stated aims of public policy more generally (see also Metz, 
2008). This is an approach that the devolved Scottish Government has largely 
adopted since developing its National Performance Framework of economic, 
environmental and social objectives in 2007 (Scottish Government, 2011). 
Interestingly, the Scottish Government has for many years downplayed the 
importance of BCR figures, regarding them as only one of many pieces of 
information informing decision making, particularly since schemes north of the 
border tend to perform less well in BCR terms due to the relatively large 
distances and low population densities involved. Such re-establishment of 
political ownership of infrastructure spend is perhaps a necessary condition 
when the mood is to build in the tens of billions rather than tens of millions of 
pounds, but it also opens up the scope for a wider range of critique and 
challenge to spending decisions and priorities than was the case when the 
‘black box’ of benefit:cost ruled. 
 
Further questions relate to the potential risks in central government’s approach 
given the diversity inherent in the multi-level governance arrangements that 
have become established for transport overall (see Bache et al, 2015). The 
nature of transport and mobility means that national plans and policies 
inevitably have many and various interfaces with other plans and policies 
developed at different spatial scales. For example, it is one thing to be able to 
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move efficiently between major cities, but transport’s contribution to economic 
growth, social inclusion and local environmental quality is especially obvious in 
cities and city regions where the density of activity and trip making is highest 
(Banister and Berechman, 2001; Centre for Cities, 2014). It is also in these 
places where the major negative externalities arising from transport (such as 
congestion, local air pollution and physical severance) are at their most acute, 
and therefore where local- and regional governance networks are keenest to 
develop detailed, deliberate strategies to deal with these problems (see Gray et 
al, 2017). 
 
Concluding thoughts: an emergent, rather than deliberate, approach to 
transport policy 
In working through the broader implications of the shifts in transport policy 
making seen under the Cameron administrations – Marsden and Reardon’s 
‘goals and logics at play’ – we are drawn to the strand of research literature that 
seeks to explain processes and outcomes of public policy decision making 
through the application of work in mainstream organisational strategy. 
Matheson (2009: 234) contends that the work of Henry Mintzberg is of 
“enduring value” as an analytical framework with which to approach the study of 
contemporary governance and policy making, or as he puts it, “the organization 
of decision making”. Most importantly for our purposes, Matheson highlights 
Mintzberg and Waters’ (1985) distinction between ‘deliberate’ and ‘emergent’ 
forms of strategy: 
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“In the deliberate mode, the formulation of strategy precedes its execution; 
in the emergent mode, the tasks of strategy formulation and execution are 
concurrent” (Matheson, 2009: 234). 
 
This deliberate/emergent categorisation neatly describes the move away from 
the consistent production of detailed strategy documents to the “strategy 
through projects” (Young et al, 2012) approach of the Cameron administrations. 
On assuming office in 2010, the Coalition was evidently sceptical towards 
grand, ‘deliberate’ strategies for action. Instead of repeating the traditional 
mistake of having a strategy but limited delivery, Ministers came to focus on 
transport project delivery and were content to let the strategy emerge later. The 
combination of stubbornly high civil engineering costs and ongoing austerity in 
the public finances could very well have led to a situation in which a ‘do 
minimum’ approach to transport was adopted, but instead the Chancellor 
decided to pursue specific projects such as Crossrail and HS2 that support a 
worldview in which (transport) infrastructure investment is a critical component 
of national competitiveness (see also Kay, 2016). Crucially, HS2 was not 
couched in terms of a wider national ‘plan’ for transport that could fall apart 
under political attack, but was promoted as a freestanding government 
objective, finally receiving parliamentary approval in March 2016. 
 
Beyond the specific decisions to pursue individual projects such as HS2 justified 
by particular political objectives, the longer-term implications of this shift in the 
organisation of decision making concern the relative power of different actors in 
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the transport policy process. Matheson (2009: 235) shows how deliberate 
strategies tend to emerge from “professional” and “machine bureaucracies”, 
structures that prize the management of consistent policy making approaches 
using “expert” or even “ideological” policy toolkits, such as CBA methodologies 
(see also Söderbaum, 2007). By contrast, emergent strategising gives more 
scope for action to politicians, but also to wider policy networks that are more 
likely to frame the objectives of policy action through collaboration and 
negotiation between competing interests, than would longstanding elite 
bureaucracies such as the British civil service (Docherty and Shaw, 2011). 
 
Thus even if they did so unwittingly, the Cameron governments’ move towards 
a more emergent form of strategy development offers at least the prospect of 
new life for some key transport policy debates in the UK. An emergent form of 
policy making organisation presents the possibility for new or neglected voices 
to be given a hearing as part of a wider debate about what investment in 
transport is actually for. Moreover, as Bovaird (2005) points out, forms of 
governance that facilitate more pluralistic, networked forms of policy 
development can in theory at least be more successful “balancing mechanisms” 
between the objectives of the bureaucratic elite (e.g. building new roads that 
improve journey times and perform well in BCR calculations) and those more 
“public” issues characterising everyday life, (e.g. incremental improvements in 
local junctions and the pedestrian environment). Of course, these potential 
developments unfold in the context of the disappointing failure of successive 
British governments to deliver on their stated transport policy aims. It remains to 
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be seen if the putative new life we identify in this paper will lead to a sustained 
change in emphasis in British transport policy.  
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Figure 1: Proposed High Speed 2 routes. 
 
 
Table 1. Key transport infrastructure statistics of selected European countries. Updated from Shaw and Docherty (2014). 
 
 
 GDP per 
capita 2015, 
PPP (Int. $) 
Population, 
2015 (m) 
Size (km2) Roads (000 
km, 2013) 
Expressways (000 km 
/ % of all roads, 2013) 
Rail (000 km / % 
electrified, 2013)  
HSR (km operational/ km 
under construction/ km long 
term planning, 2017) 
Tram / light rail 
(track km,2015) 
United 
Kingdom 
41,801 65.1 243,000 394 3.5 / 0.89 16.2 / 34.1 113/0/5443 308 
France 41,017 66.5 552,000 102 11.8 / 1.2 29.0 / 54.2 2142/634/1786 692 
Germany 48,042 81.7 357,000 644 12.9 / 2.0 37.8 / 59.4 1475/368/324 3061 
Italy 37,217 60.7 301,000 488 6.8 / 1.39 16.8 / 71.0 981/67/1269 307 
Netherlands 49,587 16.9 37,000 141 2.8 / 1.99 3.0 / 76.1 120/0/0 271 
 
Table 2: Headline transport scheme commitments, 2014. Source: after DfT 
2014a. 
 
Strategic road 
Resurfacing 80% of the network 
Starting over 100 major projects, including smart motorways, widening and dualling to bring 
key routes up to ‘expressway’ standard 
 
Rail 
HS2 
Crossrail 
Thameslink 
Inter-city Express Project 
Electrification of Great Western, Midland and Trans-Pennine mainlines, and strategic local 
lines in the North of England 
Rebuilding Birmingham New Street, Bristol Temple meads and Manchester Victoria stations 
Northern Hub capacity improvements 
Further developing the strategic freight network 
Implementing ERTMS 
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Table 3: Road schemes identified to be taken forward by Highways England 
in ‘Road Periods’ 1 (until 2019/20) and 2. Source: DfT 2014a. 
 
Region Number of 
schemes 
Cost (£bn): Period 1  
Est. Period 2  
Yorkshire and the North East 26 1.4 
Under construction 4  
Early Period 1 4  
Late Period 1 13  
Period 2 5 6.5-15.0 
Smart motorway schemes 4  
   
North West 17 1.5 
Under construction 2  
Early Period 1 2  
Late Period 1 12  
Period 2 1 0.1-0.25 
Smart motorway schemes 6  
   
Midlands 32 1.8 
Under construction 7  
Early Period 1 8  
Late Period 1 13  
Period 2 4 7.0-15.0 
Smart motorway schemes 10  
   
East 17 2.0 
Under construction 0  
Early Period 1 2  
Late Period 1 13  
Period 2 2 0.35-0.75 
Smart motorway schemes 1  
   
South East and London 31 2.2 
Under construction 1  
Early Period 1 7  
Late Period 1 21  
Period 2 2 0.2-0.5 
Smart motorway schemes 7  
   
South West 8 2.0 
Under construction 0  
Early Period 1 1  
Late Period 1 6  
Period 2 1 0.25-0.5 
Smart motorway schemes 0  
   
Total 131  
 
  
 50 
Table 4: Individual transport policies pursued by the Coalition. Source: 
www.gov.uk.  
Policy Issues Key features 
Managing, improving and 
investing in the road network 
Improving quality of the road 
network;  
Tackling congestion;  
Effective signage;  
Fair and effective local parking 
enforcement  
Investing in strategic and local 
roads; 
‘Transforming’ Highways 
Agency into a publicly owned 
company; 
Revising signage guidelines and 
promoting decluttering; 
Introduced Civil Parking Policy 
Evaluator; 
Providing guidance to local 
authorities on coordinating 
street works 
 
Making roads safer Doing more to prevent deaths 
and serious injuries; 
Improving skills and attitudes of 
drivers; 
Providing better safety education 
Addressing a loophole in drink 
driving legislation and adopting 
new drug driving legislation; 
Cycle and child safety 
campaign; 
Amending driver and rider 
training; 
Tightening up legislation on 
uninsured cars 
Expanding and improving the 
rail network 
Efficient rail services are vital for 
economic prosperity; 
Promoting modal shift to rail can 
help achieve carbon emissions 
reduction targets 
Regulated rail fares capped at 
RPI+0; 
Fares and ticketing review; 
Targeted capacity 
improvements and electrification 
programme; 
Crossrail, Thameslink and IEP; 
Reviewing franchise process; 
Additional support for 
Community Rail 
HS2: Delivering a new high 
speed rail network 
Significant extra capacity 
needed on the railway network 
Developing HS2 for delivery in 
two stages, the first of which (to 
Birmingham) to be completed by 
2026 
Promoting sustainable 
aviation 
Ensuring airports and airlines 
provide the connections ‘the UK 
needs to grow and prosper’ 
while taking account of 
environmental issues and 
making sure aviation is safe and 
secure 
New rail link to Heathrow from 
the West; 
Liberalising operations at 
Gatwick and Stansted; 
Davies Commission on SE 
England runway capacity; 
Updating aviation regulatory 
frameworks; 
Researching health and safety 
issues  
Improving local transport Promoting modal shift to public 
transport and walking / cycling 
for short journeys can help meet 
carbon emissions reductions 
targets 
 
Launching a Better Bus Areas 
fund; 
Encouraging cycling; 
Promoting smart ticketing; 
Promoting alternatives to the 
journey 
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Making transport more 
accessible to all 
Ensuring access to buses, 
coaches, transport and taxis is 
‘hassle-free’ 
Requiring these modes to be 
accessible to all through the 
Equality Act 2010 
Providing effective regulation 
of freight transport 
Efficient freight transport helps 
support the UK economy 
Proportionate regulation needed 
to promote safe and secure 
movement of goods while 
allowing costs and carbon 
emissions to be cut 
Introduction of HGV road user 
levy for UK and foreign-owned 
vehicles over 12 tonnes; 
Trialling longer HGV trailers; 
Instituting Low Emission HGV 
Task Force 
Reducing greenhouse gases 
and other emissions for 
transport 
 
Contributing to achieving carbon 
emissions reductions targets 
Investing in ultra-low emissions 
vehicle technologies; 
Clean bus technology fund and 
a small contribution to cleaner 
air in London 
Managing the risks to 
transport networks from 
terrorism and other crimes 
 
Protecting people and 
infrastructure and allowing 
efficient and effective operation 
of transport systems 
Ongoing application of relevant 
legislation and regulations 
Local Growth Deals; 
Supporting economic growth 
through local enterprise 
partnerships and enterprise 
zones; 
Giving more power back to 
cities through City Deals 
 
Creating a balanced economy 
built on private sector job 
creation; 
Devolving power to cities / city 
regions, which contain around 
three quarters of the UK’s 
population 
 
Creation of 24 enterprise zones; 
Growing Places fund to support 
local infrastructure development; 
Local Growth Deals to devolve 
more control over public 
spending to Local authorities / 
Local Enterprise Partnerships 
 
